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Optimizing resource use in complex networks with self-interested
participants (e.g. transportation networks, electric grids, Internet
systems) is a challenging and increasingly critical real-world prob-
lem. We propose an approach for solving this problem based on
multi-agent nonlinear negotiation, and demonstrate it in the context
of Wi-Fi channel assignment. We compare the performance of our
proposed approaches with a complete information optimizer based
on particle swarms, together with the de facto heuristic technique
based on using the least congested channel. We have evaluated all
these techniques in a wide range of settings, including randomly
generated scenarios and real-world ones. Our experiments show
that our approach outperforms the rest of techniques in terms of
social welfare. The particle swarm optimizer is the only technique
whose performance is close to ours, but its computation cost is much
higher. Finally, we also study the effect of some graphs metrics on
the gain that our approach can achieve.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the last years, complex networks have attracted a lot of interest
within the AI community, both due to the inherent challenge of
some network-structured optimization problems (e.g. to be NP-
hard) and due to the enormous potential for real-world applications
(many important real-world problems have network structure). An
important sub-class involves autonomous, self-interested entities
(e.g. drivers in a transportation network), which tend to cause the
network to deviate from socially-optimal behaviour.
Taking this into account, it is not surprising that problems which
combine a networked structure and self-interested parties have been
drawing attention from the AI community. Different fields of re-
search are working on the challenges these problems raise, but, so
far, with only mixed success. Optimization techniques are especially
suited to address large-scale systems with an underlying network
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structure, usually with a “divide and conquer” approach. However,
their performance severely decreases as the complexity of the sys-
tem increases [24], and with the presence of autonomous entities
which deviate from the globally optimal solution, thus harming the
social goal. Automated negotiation has proven to be valuable to
support decision-making processes in scenarios where it is neces-
sary to find an agreement quickly and with conflicting interests
involved [25]. Potential applications of automated negotiation range
from e-commerce [20] to task distribution problem solving, resource
sharing or cooperative design [27]. One of the most important ad-
vantages of automated negotiation is that it takes into account the
conflict of interests from the beginning. This enables finding more
stable solutions (agreements) which make participating agents less
prone to deviating from the socially optimal solution to favour their
privately optimal solution. Although there is significant work on
game theory and bargaining in complex networks, the nonlinear
negotiation community has made only few, very specific incursions
in complex networked problems [3].
Wi-Fi technology, based on the IEEE 802.11 standard family, has
become an omnipresent technology in our daily lives. The 2.4 GHz
wireless frequency band is the most common band where Wi-Fi
operates, and is divided into 11 partially overlapped frequency chan-
nels [22]. Due to the high number of Wi-Fi devices together with
many other technologies and devices that operate in the same band
we have to accurately choose the frequency channel where an access
point should operate in. The main purpose of this paper is to explore
the possibilities of using non-linear negotiation techniques [19] to
solve complex network problems involving self interested parties
like the problem of frequency assignment in Wi-Fi infrastructure
networks. In this setting, different Wi-Fi providers, acting as agents,
have to collectively decide how to distribute the channels used by
their access points in order to minimize interference between nodes
and thus maximize the utility (i.e. network throughput) for their
clients. This is a particularly interesting problem, since it belongs to
the family of Frequency Assignment Problems (which has been ex-
tensively studied from the perspective of discrete optimization) and
it is strongly related to the prominent mathematical graph coloring
problem [28] and to distributed constraint optimization models [11].
More specifically, we want to test the hypotheses that our non-
linear negotiation approaches can be used as an efficient alternative
to centralized, generic optimization tools. This work contributes to
achieve this goal in the following ways:
• We model the problem of Wi-Fi channel assignment as a
graph coloring problem (Section 2).
• We propose to solve this problem using nonlinear automated
negotiation techniques, and define the corresponding negotia-
tion scenario (Section 3).
• We generate a large set of scenario instances for this prob-
lem including both random and real-world settings, and we
perform extensive experimentation on these sets of instances,
comparing our negotiation approaches to three different refer-
ence techniques: a random channel assignment, the de facto
standard in Wi-Fi networks based on choosing the least con-
gested channel and a complete information nonlinear opti-
mizer based on particle swarms (Section 4).
The experimental results (Section 5) show that our benchmarked
negotiation approaches significantly outperform the reference ap-
proaches in both random scenarios and real-world settings in terms
of social welfare and fairness. Also, we identify interesting patterns
regarding the influence of graph properties such as the order, the
diameter or some well-known centrality metrics on the relative per-
formance of the approaches. The last section includes a summary of
the paper, some concluding remark and briefly describes possible
future lines of research.
2. PROBLEM MODELLING
2.1 Graph modelling
Graphs are one of the most commonly used tools for modelling
frequency assignment problems, because of the relationship between
them and the graph coloring problem, which has been widely stud-
ied by the mathematical community [28]. In graph coloring, an
abstract graph is considered, defined by a set of vertices along with
some edges connecting them, and the goal is to assign one color to
each vertex, in such a manner that the minimum possible number
of colors should be used, while avoiding monochromatic edges. In
the commonly used model for frequency assignment, graph vertices
represent elements that should be assigned a frequency while edges
represent element pairs that should not be assigned the same fre-
quency. This way, colors act as frequencies and hetero-chromatic
edges guarantee element pairs with different frequencies. Although
widely used, Tragos et al. [5] conclude that the model is not accurate
enough, because it does not reflect all the information. For instance,
the authors suggest that the information regarding adjacent channel
interferences should be incorporated into the graph.
To model the Wi-Fi channel assignment problem we propose
to use two different graphs. In both graphs, there two different
types of vertices: access points (APs) and wireless devices or clients
(WDs). Note that APs are typically wireless routers and WDs can
be laptops, smartphones... that are able to communicate with other
WDs only through the AP which they are associated to. The first
graph, called connectivity graph (G), captures the association links
between APs and WDs. Note that every WD is associated to its
closest AP, and that, since APs are the ones who set the channel to be
used by their associated clients, all nodes connected in graph G will
use the same channel (color) to communicate. The second graph,
called interference graph (I), links node pairs where the distance
between them is below the corresponding interference radiusR (that
depends on the sensitivity of the receiver): AP–AP pairs will be
linked provided that the distance condition is met, AP–WD pairs
only when the device is not associated to that AP, and WD–WD
pairs only if both devices are associated to different APs, since the
communications among the elements connected to the same AP are
coordinated and do not interfere. The next section describes the
interference model in more detail.
2.2 Interferences and utility of the solutions
The weight of the edges in graph I represents the interference
between the nodes they link and it can be computed, for a node
operating in channel i and the other node operating in channel j (i
and j ∈ {1, . . . , 11}), as:
Ij = Pt +Gt +Gr − L− Ploss +W (i, j) + ψ,
where Pt stands for the transmission power (in dBm), Gt (Gr)
stands for the transmission (reception) antenna gain (in dB) and L
stands for losses due to walls, windows and other obstacles in the
propagation (in dB). W (i, j), called the co-channel index, can be
understood as the interference between color i and color j. This
index includes the interferences not only between adjacent colors but
also between colors in a certain distance range, to take into account
the partial overlapping between frequency channels in Wi-Fi. To
model this effect, we have used the values obtained in [22]. On
the other side, ψ, called activity index, accounts for the fact that
a higher bandwidth data flow will occupy the wireless channel a
higher fraction of the time. Finally, Ploss stands for propagation
losses (in dB) and has been computed according to [10], that defines
signal losses in the 2.4GHz frequency band as:
Ploss = 7.6 + 40 log10 d− 20 log10(hthr),
where d is the distance between interfering nodes, in meters, and ht
(hr) is the transmission (reception) antenna height, also in meters.
Once there is a model for interfering signals, the signal to noise
ratio for terminal i (SINRi) can be computed as the ratio between






being P the power of the desired signal and M the number of
interference signals (Ij) that are received.
Note that each AP will have a SINR value for every terminal
that is associated to it. In that case, we will assume that its SINR
will be the minimum of all of them, which is in fact the worst case.
To quantify the goodness of the different network colorings, we
consider that the utility of an AP is closely related to the perceived
throughput and SINR. According to [1], in a wireless network
the throughput equals a maximum value when the SINR is over
a certain value SINRmax and monotonically decreases with the
reduction of SINR until an insufficient value of SINR, called
SINRmin, is reached, when the throughput falls to zero. We
can consider the utility perceived by node i (Ui) as a normalized
throughput, so it can be defined as a value ranging from 0 to 1, with
0 corresponding to the situations when there is a very low-quality
reception and the devices cannot keep connected (throughput equals
to zero), and 1 corresponding to the case when the signal quality
is excellent (throughput equals to its maximum value). Threshold
values for SINR have been defined from the values presented
in [9]. Finally, the utility value for a specific provider Pi (UPi ) is
computed as the sum of the utility values for all its APs and the
clients associated to these APs.
With the aforementioned description, we can formally formulate
the problem as follows. Given a geometric graph G, together with
a spectrum of k = 11 colors (channels) endowed with a k × k
matrix W of interferences between them, the goal is to determine
a k-coloring c for the AP-vertices of G such that the sum of utility
values for all the nodes in the graph (APs and WDs) is maximized,




Ui(G,W, c) | c is a coloring of V (G)
 ,
where V (G) denotes the set of vertices of G and Ui(G,W, c) de-
notes the utility for the vertex i of graph G under the coloring c, for




In this work, we propose to tackle the network-structured channel
assignment problem in Wi-Fi using automated negotiation tech-
niques. Automated negotiation is quite a wide field [6] but most
authors agree that a negotiation problem can be characterized by a
negotiation domain (who negotiates and what they negotiate about),
an interaction protocol (which rules govern the negotiation process),
and a set of decision mechanisms or strategies that guide the negoti-
ating agents through every phase of the interaction protocol [7]. In
the following we define our particular negotiation problem along
these three dimensions.
3.1 Negotiation Domain
For the scope of this work, we assume a multiattribute negotiation
domain, where a deal or solution to the problem is defined as the
set of attributes (issues), and each one of them can be in a certain
range. In our case, for a channel assignment problem with nAP
access points, a solution or deal S can be expressed as S = {si|i ∈
1, ..., nAP }, where si ∈ {1, . . . , 11} represents the assignation of
a Wi-Fi channel to the i-th access point.
In this work, we assume that there are different network providers
or agents (commonly Internet Service Providers, ISPs), thus APs
belong to one of the agents. Each provider only has control over
the channel assignment for its own access points. According to
this situation, the agents will negotiate the channel assignment.
Finally, each one of these agents will compute its utility for a certain
solution according to the model described in the previous section.
The problem settings (high cardinality of the solution space and
attribute interdependence) will make the utility functions highly
complex, with multiple local optima.
3.2 Interaction Protocol
There are many interaction protocols for negotiations in the litera-
ture, from the classical alternating offers model [26] to auction-based
protocols [12]. From the assumption that the negotiation scenarios
coming from Wi-Fi channel assignment will be highly nonlinear,
and according to the discussion in [19], we have chosen a simple
text mediation protocol [15]. In its simplest version, the negotiation
protocol will be as follows:
1. It starts with a randomly-generated candidate contract (Sc0).
This means to assign each AP a random channel.
2. In each iteration t, the mediator proposes a contract Sct to the
rest of agents.
3. Each agent either accepts or rejects the contract Sct .
4. The mediator generates a new contract Sct+1 from the previous
contracts and from the votes received from the agents and the
process moves to step 2.
This process goes on until a maximum number of iterations is
reached. The protocol, as defined, is rather generic and must be
completed with the definition of the decision mechanisms to be used
by the negotiating agents and the mediator.
3.3 Decision Mechanisms
For the mediator, we have implemented a single-issue mutation
mechanism [15] for the generation of new contracts, which works
as follows:
• If at time t all agents have accepted the presented contract Sct ,
this contract will be used as the base contract Sb to generate
the next contract Sct+1. Otherwise, the last mutually accepted
contract will be used.
• To generate the next candidate contract Sct+1, the mediator
takes the base contract Sb and mutates one of its issues ran-
domly. In our case of study, this would correspond to choosing
a random access point and selecting a new random channel
for it.
• After a fixed number of iterations, the mediator advertises the
last mutually accepted contract as final.
For the agents, we have considered two different mechanisms to
vote about the candidate contracts Sct :
• Hill-climber (HC): In this case, the agent behaves as a greedy
utility maximizer. The agent will only accept a contract when
it has at least the same utility for her than the previous mu-
tually accepted contract. The first contract proposed by the
mediator is accepted by default.
• Annealer (SA): This negotiation mechanism, that we first pro-
posed in [15] and was further refined in [18] and [17], uses
a widespread nonlinear optimization technique called simu-
lated annealing (SA) [14]. The mechanism is similar to HC,
but when a contract yields a utility loss against the previous
mutually accepted contract, there will be a probability for the
agent to accept it nonetheless. This probability Pa depends
on the utility loss associated to the new contract ∆u and also
depends on a parameter known as annealing temperature τ ,
so that Pa = e
−∆u
τ . Annealing temperature begins at an
initial value, and linearly decreases to zero throughout the
successive iterations of the protocol.
The choice of these two mechanisms is not arbitrary. Simulated
annealing techniques have yielded very satisfactory results in ne-
gotiation for nonlinear utility spaces [18, 17], and are the basis for
several of other works [19]. Furthermore, as discussed in [15], the
comparison between hill-climbers and annealers allows to assess
whether the scenario under consideration is a highly complex one,
since in such scenarios greedy optimizers tend to get stuck in local
optima, while the simulated annealing optimizer tends to escape
from them.
4. SCENARIOS, BENCHMARKS AND MET-
RICS
4.1 Considered scenarios
In this paper, we make the common assumption that Wi-Fi nodes
(APs and clients) are static elements. As in our problem there is
not any element that evolves with time, we deal with the problem
of evaluating the performance of a particular channel assignment
strategy by means of the computation described in Section 2.
Figure 1: Polytechnic School building plan.
Moreover, the choice of the configuration parameters for the stud-
ied scenarios has been driven by considering typical or reasonable
power transmission and sensitivity parameters from a realistic point
of view [4]. We have made the assumption that clients associate
to the AP which is closer to them. Finally, for each scenario, we
randomly assigned half of the APs to each agent.
With these assumptions, we have performed experiments both in
randomly generated scenarios where APs and clients are randomly
distributed throughout the environment, and in a real-world setting.
For the random scenarios we have generated scenarios varying the
number of APs (15, 50 and 100) and the number of clients per AP
(1, 5 and 10). Combining these parameters, we have generated eight
categories with 50 different graphs per category, for a total of 400
scenarios. This allowed us to have a wide range of problem sizes
(from tens of nodes to roughly one thousand nodes), and also a wide
diversity (due to the randomization of node placement).
For the real-world setting, we have made use of the real layout of
the first floor plant of our building, the Polythecnic School of the
University of Alcala. The sides of this square-shaped building are
approximately 130 meters long. In Fig. 1 we provide the plan of this
building, where the real positions of deployed APs are displayed
with green dots and where signal coverage ranges from red (high
coverage) to light blue (very low coverage). In this figure we can
observe that the floor is equipped with 26 APs. Note that the center
of the plan represents a central courtyard, so it has low signal cov-
erage. For the position of WDs we have considered that we have
users attending classes in classrooms and also some students are lo-
cated randomly in the building (resting, in the cafeteria, studying...).
For this last group of students, we have considered that there are
100 students randomly located in the building following a uniform
distribution. For the students in classrooms, we have tested several
scenarios varying randomly the ratio of classrooms being used Ψ,
with Ψ ∈ [0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0]. As there are 48 classrooms in the
building, we have considered scenarios with 12, 24, 36 and 48 class-
rooms. For each classroom, we have deployed 25 students in each
one randomly using a normal distribution around the center of each
classroom and a standard deviation normalized to the size of the
scenario of 0.05. In Table 1 we show a summary of the real-world
scenarios under study. Finally, as the specific random classrooms
in use could affect the results, we have tested three experiments for
Figure 2: Connectivity graph G for Scenario 1.
Figure 3: Interference graph I for Scenario 1.
each value of Ψ (except for Ψ = 1 because all classrooms are in
use in this setting), for a total of 10 deployments. As an example,
Figure 2 shows the association between APs and WDs (graph G
according to Section 2.1) of Scenario 1, while Fig. 3 shows the
potential interferences between network elements (graph I in Sec-
tion 2.1). In both figures, APs are represented by green circles and
WDs by small black squares.
It is in this real-world setting where the role of the mediator can
be more easily understood. In contrast to home and legacy wireless
networks that provide access via independent wireless APs, enter-
prise wireless networks, like the one just described, make use of a
centralized entity, known as wireless controller. A wireless LAN
controller is used in combination with protocols such as Lightweight
Access Point Protocol (LWAPP) or Control And Provisioning of
Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP) to manage access points in large
quantities by the network administrator or network operations cen-
Table 1: Summary of scenarios of the real-world setting.
Scenario Ψ # Classrooms # WD
1, 2, 3 0.25 12 400
4, 5, 6 0.5 12 700
7, 8, 9 0.75 12 1000
10 1.0 48 1300
ter. This controller is in charge of choosing the proper channel for
every AP that it manages, and pushing that configuration into the
APs. In this model, there is not a discrete and individual selection
of frequencies, but they are proposed by the controller instead; the
controller collects information from the APs, and uses that infor-
mation to come with a global frequency allocation. This fits rather
well with the mediated approach we are proposing: the frequency
assignment proposal could be determined by a mediator process
running in the wireless controller or external to several wireless
controllers (one per provider). Even for home wireless networks,
the need for Wi-Fi providers in a geographical area to collaborate
to enhance the performance of wireless networks has been pointed
out [23] and there are ISPs advocating for the central administration
of home wireless access points.
4.2 Benchmarking techniques
In addition to the negotiation techniques we propose, presented
in Section 3, we have included a comparison with three reference
techniques:
• Random Reference: as a first base line, in this technique each
AP chooses a channel randomly.
• Least Congested Channel search (LCCS): LCCS is the de-
facto standard for Wi-Fi channel assignment [2], and its
based on each AP sensing the channel occupation and asyn-
chronously choosing the channel where it finds the lowest
interferences from other active APs and their clients. We have
implemented a coordinated LCCS, where there is a centralized
controller which evaluates the proposed changes before actu-
ally implementing them, thus preventing utility oscillations.
This is a usual implementation in corporate environments.
• Particle Swarm Optimization (ALPSO): additionally to our
negotiator based on simulated annealing, we wanted to have,
as a reference, a nonlinear optimizer using complete informa-
tion. We have chosen a parallel augmented Lagrange multi-
plier particle swarm optimizer, which solves nonlinear non-
smooth constrained problems using an augmented Lagrange
multiplier approach to handle constraints [13].
4.3 Graph metrics for performance evaluation
Among the aims of this work, we are interested in studying how
the structural properties of the network influence the performance of
optimization and negotiation approaches used to solve the problem.
To this end, we have compared our experimental results with respect
to a number of graph metrics selected from the literature. The first
two of them are global metrics, while the rest are averages of a
centrality metric, a local measure of the importance of a node within
a graph:
• Graph order: The total number of nodes in the graph.
• Graph diameter: The longest distance between any pair of
nodes in the graph [21].
• Average degree centrality: The degree centrality of a vertex
is defined as its number of neighbors. Hence, the average
degree centrality is ∑
v∈V deg(v)
|V (G)| .
By the handshaking lemma
∑
v∈V deg(v) = 2|E(G)|, the
average degree centrality is related to the density of the graph,
defined as the ratio between the actual number of edges and
the maximum possible number of edges
|E(G)|(|V (G)|
2
) = ∑v∈V deg(v)|V (G)| 1|V (G)| − 1 .
• Average closeness centrality: The closeness centrality of a
node v is the inverse of the farness, normalized by the number
of other nodes
|V (G)| − 1∑
w∈V \{w} d(v, w)
.
• Average eigenvector centrality. The eigenvector centrality
identifies nodes that are connected to many other
well-connected nodes. Storing the centralities of the vertices
in a vector, this turns out to be the eigenvector associated to the
largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of the graph [16].
• Average betweenness centrality. The betweenness centrality
of a node v is based on the number of shortest paths in the
graph passing through that node. In particular, for each s, t
different from v, the ratio of shortest paths between s and t
containing v is obtained, and these ratios are summed up [16].
One of our hypothesis is that these metrics may be used as a
basis for mechanism selection in networked problems involving
self-interested parties. In this paper we have used these metrics to
compare the relative performance of the benchmarked approaches.
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION
In this section, we describe and discuss the results of our experi-
ments. For the sake of clarity, we initially analyze separately both
types of scenarios (random and real-world), and then we study the
impact of graph metrics in performance for both types. For all the
experiments we show we have performed 20 repetitions.
5.1 Random scenarios
In the first set of experiments, we study the effect of having differ-
ent number of providers or agents (p) in the 400 random scenarios
using SA. APs have been randomly assigned to the p providers.
Table 2 shows the average normalized utility (Un) for these ex-
periments for p ∈ {1, 2, 5, 10}. Note that the normalized utility
has been computed as the quotient between the sum of the utili-
ties achieved by each node and the number of nodes (graph order).
Results show that increasing the number of agents moderately de-
creases the utility, as the available information for the channel as-
signment is distributed among a higher number of agents when p
increases. From now on, we focus in the two-provider case (p = 2)
because there are more works in complex bilateral negotiations than
for the multilateral case (three or more agents).
Next, we study the performance of the benchmarked techniques
(random, LCCS, HC, SA and ALPSO) in the different scenario cat-
egories, recording the achieved social welfare (normalized utility)
and fairness as defined in [8]. Figure 4 shows the average normal-
ized utility (Un) obtained by each technique for all the graphs in
each category. Note that the graph categories have been ordered
decreasingly according to the mean value of Un obtained for all
the studied techniques (these mean values are represented with a
solid horizontal line for each category). Each bar in the figure also
includes the 95% confidence interval. In all the studied scenarios,
the worst performance is, as it could be expected, the random assign-
ment. The performance of LCCS is better than random but worse
Figure 4: Normalized utility (Un) for the evaluated techniques in random scenarios.
Figure 5: Fairness for the evaluated techniques in random scenarios.
Table 2: Normalized utility for different number of agents (p)
in random scenarios using SA.
Scenario p = 1 p = 2 p = 5 p = 10
(50, 250)
0.548 0.538 0.525 0.521
0.615 0.602 0.596 0.591
0.618 0.604 0.592 0.587
(50, 500)
0.488 0.482 0.470 0.465
0.479 0.472 0.462 0.451
0.547 0.535 0.526 0.521
(100, 500)
0.437 0.427 0.402 0.400
0.447 0.429 0.425 0.410
0.411 0.401 0.383 0.384
than the rest of techniques. Comparing HC, SA and ALPSO we can
conclude that, although their performance is quite similar, SA is
the best technique for all the scenarios under study (there is a little
advantage for the hill climber (HC) in the simplest category, but it
is not statistically significant). As the scenarios grow more complex,
the distance between SA and the rest of techniques increases, which
is reasonable since the size of the solution space becomes larger.
The increasing distance between SA andHC confirms our hypothe-
sis that these scenarios are highly nonlinear [15]. It is also important
to note that, for the more complex scenarios, the SA negotiator sig-
nificantly outperforms the particle swarm optimizer (ALPSO). This
is a remarkable result, specially taking into account that SA reaches
the optimum faster than the ALPSO optimizer.
Next, we study the performance of the different techniques under
study in terms of their fairness (F ). We use the definition of fairness
given in [8], i.e.:






being N the number of nodes (graph order), ui the utility for node
i and u the average utility for all nodes. From this definition, note
that lower values for F are better. Figure 5 shows the performance
in terms of fairness for the studied techniques in the different graph
categories. For the simpler graphs ((15, 15), (15, 75), (15, 150) and
(50, 50)), HC, SA and ALPSO clearly outperforms the LCCS and
Random. However, this is not true for the more complex scenarios,
where there is not a clear ordering but in some cases Random is the
fairest solution. To explain this behaviour we have to consider both
fairness and utility together. As the performance in terms of utility
for Random is very poor, it is much easier to reach fair (but poor)
solutions between nodes. For that reason, we have computed the
ratio between the normalized utility (Un) and the fairness (F ) to
compare the different techniques, calling this value UF . In Table 3
we show the quotient between UF for the different techniques under
study and UFSA, which is the value of UF for SA. Values below
one in the table mean that SA is able to obtain better results. From
that table we can conclude that SA offers the best results in all cases
except for the simplest graphs (15, 15), where HC and ALPSO
slightly outperform SA.
5.2 Real-world setting
For the real-world scenarios, Fig. 6 shows the normalized utility
(Un) for the different techniques under study, while Table 4 shows
the quotient between UF for the studied techniques and UFSA.
Regarding Fig. 6, results show, again, that the annealer SA outper-
forms the Random assignment, LCCS and HC. Comparing SA and
Figure 6: Normalized utility (Un) for the evaluated techniques in real-world setting.
(a) Order. (b) Diameter.
Figure 7: Utility of SA relative to ALPSO for different graph metrics.
Table 3: UF relative to UFSA in random scenarios.
Scenario Random LCCS HC ALPSO
(15, 15) 0.13 0.19 1.03 1.01
(15, 75) 0.21 0.33 0.83 0.87
(15, 150) 0.27 0.40 0.79 0.84
(50, 50) 0.23 0.52 0.91 0.87
(50, 250) 0.48 0.69 0.89 0.86
(50, 500) 0.54 0.73 0.89 0.88
(100, 100) 0.41 0.66 0.90 0.85
(100, 500) 0.62 0.77 0.93 0.90
the complete-information optimizer ALPSO we show that their per-
formance in the real-world scenarios are fairly similar, being SA
slightly better in Scenarios 1-8 and slightly worse in Scenarios 9 and
10. Table 4 shows that if we analyze utility together with fairness,
SA behaves as the best solution in all the studied real-world settings.
For that reason, we can conclude that in the real-world setting the
use of SA for Wi-Fi channel assignment is advantageous in terms of
social welfare and fairness.
5.3 Impact of different graph metrics
In this section, we analyze the results of the best performing
approach (SA) with respect to the different metrics discussed in
Section 4.3. This comparison is done in terms of the normalized
Table 4: UF relative to UFSA in real-world setting.
Scenario Random LCCS HC ALPSO
1 0.58 0.78 0.87 0.90
2 0.52 0.75 0.89 0.92
3 0.45 0.75 0.83 0.90
4 0.53 0.70 0.81 0.92
5 0.60 0.85 0.89 0.96
6 0.56 0.83 0.88 0.92
7 0.57 0.83 0.88 0.97
8 0.53 0.78 0.84 0.96
9 0.59 0.83 0.86 0.97
10 0.63 0.88 0.91 0.99
utility that the SA negotiator obtains relative to the particle swarm
optimizer ALPSO, i.e. we show the quotient USA/UALPSO . We
have plotted these results for both random scenarios (blue dots) and
real-world scenarios (red crosses). Note that, for all figures, we
also include a dashed line that corresponds to the USA = UALPSO
baseline. Regarding the graph order, in Fig. 7a, for the random
scenarios we can see an approximately linear increasing gain for
SA, with ALPSO doing better for low-order graphs and SA getting
to gains up to 10% for the larger graphs. However, this behaviour
does not hold for the real-world scenarios, where the gain decreases
with the order. From this result we can conclude that the graph
(a) Degree centrality. (b) Closeness centrality.
(c) Eigenvector centrality. (d) Betweenness centrality.
Figure 8: Utility of SA relative to ALPSO for different graph centrality metrics.
order can not be used alone to estimate the gain that can be expected
from using SA. Figure 7b suggests that there may be optimal values
of graph diameter regarding the performance of SA. For example,
it is reasonable to expect small gains for both low and high graph
diameters.
In Fig. 8 we show the gain obtained by SA respect to ALPSO for
the four different centrality metrics defined in Section 4.3. Note that
these metrics are defined for each node, so we show their average
value for each graph. Examining these figures we can see that all
of them show a clear and narrow range of centralities for which
the largest gains are obtained. For closeness centrality (Fig. 8b),
the results are better for larger average centrality, with the oppo-
site behaviour for the other three types of centrality. Interestingly
enough, the eigenvector centrality (Fig. 8c), which is smaller when
there are less nodes connected to many well-connected nodes, is the
only centrality for which the adequate values lead to SA outperform-
ing ALPSO in all the random scenarios. The real-world scenarios,
however, have very similar values for all the centralities considered,
which have led to both gains and losses for SA.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Optimizing resource use in complex networks with self-interested
participants is a challenging and increasingly critical real-world
problem. This paper studies and evaluates the use of multiagent
negotiation techniques for WiFi-channel assignment, which is a
realistic problem derived from the popular graph coloring and fre-
quency assignment problems. We compare the negotiation-based
approaches with both the de facto standard for Wi-Fi channel as-
signment and a nonlinear centralized optimizer. Experiments show
that the negotiation-based approaches outperform the references in
both social welfare and fairness.
Although our experiments have yielded satisfactory results, there
is still plenty of research to be done in this area. A more in-depth
metric analysis is needed, specially to determine if the observed
correlations among metrics are inherent or caused by a scenario
generation bias. We are also exploring fully-distributed mechanisms
based on belief propagation. Finally, we are interested in evaluating
the strategic properties of the mechanisms, to see how they perform
when agents are allowed to “lie” in their messages in order to try to
influence the outcome of the mechanism to their advantage.
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